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Given that data indicates several countries with same, or nearly same, degree of tax
evasion but widely diﬀerent levels of reserve requirements, this paper analyzes the re-
lationship between the “optimal” degree of tax evasion and mandatory cash reserve
requirements required to be held by banks using a simple overlapping generations frame-
work. Proceeding on the initial premises that the above observation may be a fallout
of the possibilities of multiple levels of tax evasion given the reserve requirements and
other policy variables, or that the optimal degree of tax evasion may be completely
unaﬀected by the movements in reserve requirements, we ﬁnd the latter to be true. The
model also suggests the following: (i) An economy with a less corrupt structure will have
a higher steady-state of value of reported income; (ii) Increases in the penalty rates of
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1evading taxes would induce consumers to report greater fraction of their income, while
increases in the income-tax rates would cause them to evade greater fraction of their
income, and ; (iii) The model does not vindicate the popular belief in the literature
that, countries with lower percentage of reported income tend to have higher reserve
requirements.
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21 Introduction
This paper analyzes the relationship between the “optimal” degree of tax evasion and mandatory
cash reserve requirements required to be held by banks, for eight European economies, using a
simple overlapping generations framework.1 More precisely, the analysis tries to provide a microe-
conomic foundation to the process of tax evasion given the policy decisions of the social planner.
The motivation for such an analysis is simply derived from the observed fact in the data that,
there are several countries with same, or nearly same, degree of tax evasion but widely diﬀerent
levels of reserve requirements. Strictly speaking, the paper tries to provide an explanation to this
observation, and to the best of our knowledge is ﬁrst in such an attempt. In addition to this the
paper also derives the optimal values of the policy variables given the degree of tax evasion.
The above observation may be a fallout of any two of the following possibilities
(i) There may be multiple levels of tax evasion given the reserve requirements and other policy
variables;
(ii) The optimal degree of tax evasion may be completely unaﬀected by the movements in reserve
requirements.
We look into eight European economies and Table 1 compares the level of tax evasion, based on
the average size of the underground economy in 1997-98, derived from Schneider and Klinglmair
(2004), and the average reserve requirements over the period of 1980-1998.2 The second column
of the table reports the size of the evasion parameter. The value of the evasion parameter lies
between 0.115 (U.K) and 0.225 (Greece), which implies that for Greece 22.5 percent of the taxes
are evaded and for that of U.K. the value is 11.5 percent. As one can see that there are countries
1The analysis is general and can be applied to any country where reserve requirements are used as a monetary
policy tool.
2For details of the calculations of the degree of tax evasion, see the calibration section of Chapter 2.
3with identical (Spain and Portugal, and France and Germany), or near identical (Greece and Italy,
and Spain, Portugal and Belgium) degrees of tax evasion, but diﬀerent reserve requirements. The
table clearly vindicates our claim made above and provides us with the motivation of the paper.
Table 1: Tax Evasion and Reserve Requirements (1980-98)









Sources: (i) IFS – IMF International Financial Statistics.
(ii) Schneider and Klinglmair (2004).
Notes: (i) Section 6 of Chapter 2.
(ii)Values of reserve-deposit ratio are in percentages.
The paper incorporates endogenous tax evasion in a standard general equilibrium model of
overlapping generations. There are two primary assets in the model storage (capital) and ﬁat
money. Storage dominates money in rate of return. An intermediary exists to provide a rudimentary
pooling function, accepting deposits to ﬁnance the investment needs of the ﬁrms, but are subjected
to mandatory cash-reserve requirements. There is also an inﬁnitely lived government with two
wings: a treasury which ﬁnances expenditure by taxing income and setting penalty for tax evasion
4when caught; and the central bank, which controls the growth rate of the nominal stock of money
and the reserve requirements. In such an environment we deduce the optimal degree of tax evasion,
derived from the consumer optimization problem, as function of the parameters and policy variables
of the model. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the economic environment;
Section 3, 4, 5 and 6 respectively, are devoted in deﬁning the monetary competitive equilibrium,
discussing the process of calibration, analyzing the behavior of the optimal degree of tax evasion
corresponding to movements in the reserve-deposit ratio and deriving the optimal values of the
policy variables, given the degree of tax evasion. Section 7 concludes and lays out the areas of
further research.
2 Economic Environment
Time is divided into discrete segments, and is indexed by t = 1, 2,...... There are four theaters of
economic activities: (i) each two-period lived overlapping generations household (consumer/worker)
is endowed with one unit of labor when young, but the agent retires when old. The labor endow-
ment is supplied inelastically to earn wage income, a part of the tax-liability is evaded, with evasion
being determined endogenously to maximize utility, and the rest is deposited into banks for future
consumption; (ii) each inﬁnitely lived producer is endowed with a production technology to man-
ufacture the single ﬁnal good, using the inelastically supplied labor, physical capital and credit
facilitated by the ﬁnancial intermediaries; (iii) the banks simply converts one period deposit con-
tracts into loans, after meeting the cash reserve requirements. No resources are assumed to be spent
in running the banks, and; (iv) there is an inﬁnitely lived government which meets its expenditure
by taxing income, setting penalty for tax evasion when caught, and controlling the inﬂation tax
instruments – the money growth rate and the reserve requirements. There is a continuum of each
5type of economic agents with unit mass.
The sequence of events can be outlined as follows: When young a household works receives pre-
paid wages, evades a part of the tax burden and deposits the rest into banks. A bank, after meeting
the reserve requirement, provides a loan to a goods producer, which subsequently manufactures
the ﬁnal good and returns the loan with interests. Finally, the banks pay back the deposits with
interests to households at the end of the ﬁrst period and the latter consumes in the second period.
2.1 Consumers
Given that the consumers possess an unit of time endowment which is supplied inelastically, and
consumes only when old, formally the problem of the consumer can be described as follows: The
utility of a consumer born at t depends on real consumption, ct+1, implying that the consumer
consumes only when old. The assumptions make computations tractable and is not a bad ap-
proximation of the real world.3 All consumers have the same preferences so that there exists a
representative consumer in each generation. The utility function of a consumer born at time t can
be written as follows:
Ut = u(ct+1) (1)
where U is twice diﬀerentiable; moreover u0 > 0 and u00 < 0 and u0(0) = 1. The above utility
function is maximized subject to the following constraints:
Dt · q[(1 ¡ ¯¿t)ptwt ¡ ´(1 ¡ ¯)
2ptwt] + (1 ¡ q)[(1 ¡ ¯¿t)ptwt ¡ µt¿t(1 ¡ ¯)ptwt ¡ ´(1 ¡ ¯)
2ptwt] (2)
pt+1ct+1 · (1 + iDt+1)Dt (3)
where equation (2)4 is the feasibility (ﬁrst-period) budget constraint and equation (3) denotes the
second period budget constraint for the consumer. pt (pt+1) denotes the money price of the ﬁnal
3See Hall (1988).
4This equation implicitly assumes the existence of some sort of an insurance mechanism that always ensures the
consumer a certain amount of deposits dt, in our case. Alternatively, we could have assumed the consumer to be
6good at t (t + 1); Dt is the per-capita nominal deposits; 1 ¡ q is the probability of getting caught
when evading tax; ¯ is the fraction of tax paid; ¿t is the income tax rate at t; µt is the penalty
imposed, when audited and caught, at t; wt is the real wage at t, ´ > 0, is a cost parameter, and;
iDt+1 is the nominal interest rate received on the deposits at t + 1.
The constraints can be explained as follows: For the potential evader, there are (ex-ante) two
possible situations: “success” (i.e., getting away with evasion) and “failure” (i.e., getting discovered
and being convicted). If the consumer is found guilty of concealing an amount of income (1¡¯)ptwt,
then he has to pay the amount of the evaded tax liability, (1¡¯)¿tptwt and a proportional ﬁne at a
rate of µt > 1. Notice we have assumed that the household has to incur transaction costs to evade
taxes. These basically involve costs of hiring lawyers to avoid/reduce tax burdens, and bribes paid
to tax oﬃcials and administrators. The transaction costs are incurred in evading taxes are assumed
to be increasing in both degree of tax evasion and the wage income of the household. The form ´
(1 ¡ ¯)2 ptwt is consistent with our assumptions about the behavior of transaction costs. Note a
higher value of ´, would imply a less corrupted economy, implying that it is more diﬃcult to evade
taxes. We also endogenize the probability of getting caught, q, by assuming it to be an increasing
function of the degree of tax evasion. q takes the following quadratic form:
1 ¡ q = (1 ¡ ¯)2 (4)
The second-period budget constraint is self-explanatory suggesting that the consumer when old
consumes out of the interest income from deposits – the only source of income, given that he is
retired. The household chooses ¯ to maximize his utility from second-period consumption subject
risk-neutral. In that case equation (2) would be the expected value of the deposits obtained. So in some sense we
have an observationally equivalent formulation. Our results are, however, independent of whether the consumer is
risk-averse or risk neutral, once we assume the existence of an implicit insurance scheme. Our formulation follows
Chen (2003).
7to the intertemporal budget constraint given as follows:
ct+1 · (1 + rdt+1)[(1 ¡ ¯¿t) ¡ µt¿t(1 ¡ ¯)3 ¡ ´(1 ¡ ¯)2]wt (5)
where rdt+1 is the real interest rate on deposits at period t + 1. Note (1 + rdt+1) =
1+iDt+1
1+¼t+1 , where
1 + ¼t+1 =
pt+1
pt .
Realizing that both the real interest rate on deposits and the wages would depend on the degree
of tax evasion, the ﬁrst order condition for the consumer is given as follows:
dU
d¯










The optimal value of ¯ at steady-state is determined below after the equilibrium conditions are
imposed and the steady state value of the capital stock is determined.
2.2 Financial Intermediaries
At the start of each period the ﬁnancial intermediaries accept deposits and make their portfolio
decision (that is, loans and cash reserves choices) with a goal of maximizing proﬁts. At the end of
the period they receive their interest income from the loans made and meets the interest obligations
on the deposits. Note the intermediaries are constrained by legal requirements on the choice of
their portfolio (that is, reserve requirements), as well as by feasibility. Given such a structure, the
intermediaries obtains the optimal choice for Lt by solving the following problem:
max
L;D
¼b = iLtLt ¡ iDtDt (7)
s:t: : °tDt + Lt 6 Dt (8)
where ¼b is the proﬁt function for the ﬁnancial intermediary, and Mt > °tDt deﬁnes the legal
reserve requirement. Mt is the cash reserves held by the bank; Lt is the loans; iLt is the interest
8rate on loans, and; °t is the reserve requirement ratio. The reserve requirement ratio is the ratio
of required reserves (which must be held in form of currency) to deposits.
To gain some economic intuition of the role of reserve requirements, let us consider the solution
of the problem for a typical intermediary. Free entry, drives proﬁts to zero and we have
iLt(1 ¡ °t) ¡ iDt = 0 (9)





Reserve requirements thus tend to induce a wedge between the interest rate on savings and
lending rates for the ﬁnancial intermediary. Note, many countries impose a variety of obstacles to
proper functioning of the intermediation system. Examples of such impediments include portfolio
restrictions, taxes, and requirements that loans to favored sectors be made at interest rates below
the market level (popularly called, Priority Sector Lending). To some extent these restrictions can
be viewed a wedge between the interest rates goods producing ﬁrms pay banks and the rate banks
ultimately receive on their loans. This can be easily incorporated in our model, by slightly refor-
mulating the problem of the ﬁnancial intermediaries.5 Given that in most of our model economies,
interest rates were deregulated in the mid-1980, the reasons for including this wedge factor in our
analysis was not very compelling.6 Moreover, a tax on the interst earnings of the banks intro-
duces a similar type of wedge between the lending and borrowing rates as is obtained through the
imposition of reserve requirements.
5See Espinosa(1995), Espinosa and Yip (1996) and Chari, Jones and Manuelli (1996) for an explicit theoretical
treatment of the above argument.
6See Bacchetta and Caminal (1992), for a detailed survey.
92.3 Firms
Each ﬁrm produces a single ﬁnal good using a standard neoclassical production function F(kt;nt),
with kt and nt, respectively denoting the capital and labor input at time t. The production
technology is assumed to take the Cobb-Douglas form:
Y = F(k;n) = k®n(1¡®) (11)
where 0 < ® ((1 ¡ ®)) < 1, is the elasticity of output with respect to capital (labor). At date
t the ﬁnal good can either be consumed or stored. Next we assume that producers are capable
of converting bank loans Lt into ﬁxed capital formation such that ptikt = Lt, where it denotes
the investment in physical capital. Notice that the production transformation schedule is linear
so that the same technology applies to both capital formation and the production of consumption
good and hence both investment and consumption good sell for the same price p. Moreover, we
follow Diamond and Yellin (1990) and Chen, Chiang and Wang (2000) in assuming that the goods
producer is a residual claimer, i.e., the producer uses up the unsold consumption good in a way
which is consistent with lifetime value maximization of the ﬁrms. such an assumption regarding
ownership avoids the “unnecessary” Arrow-Debreu redistribution from ﬁrms to consumers and
simultaneously retains the general equilibrium structure.
The representative ﬁrm at any point of time t maximizes the discounted stream of proﬁt ﬂows









t ¡ ptwtnt ¡ (1 + iLt)Lt] (12)
kt+1 6 (1 ¡ ±k)kt + ikt (13)
ptikt = Lt (14)
10where ½ is the ﬁrm owners (constant) discount factor, and ±k is the (constant) rate of capital
depreciation. The ﬁrm solves the above problem to determine the demand for labor and investment.
The ﬁrm’s problem can be written in the following recursive formulation:




t ¡ ptwtnt ¡ pt(1 + iLt)(kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±k)kt)] + ½V (kt+1) (15)
The upshot of the above dynamic programming problem are the following ﬁrst order conditions.
kt+1 : (1 + iLt)pt = ½V 0(kt+1) (16)






And the following envelope condition.





+ (1 + iLt)(1 ¡ ±k)] (18)
Optimization, leads to the following eﬃciency condition, besides (16), for the production ﬁrm.





+ (1 + iLt+1)(1 ¡ ±k)] (19)
Equation (19) provides the condition for the optimal investment decision of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm
compares the cost of increasing investment in the current period with the future stream of beneﬁt
generated from the extra capital invested in the current period. And equation (17) simply states
that the ﬁrm hires labor up to the point where the marginal product of labor equates the real wage.
2.4 Government
As discussed above we have an inﬁnitely lived government with two wings: the treasury and
the central bank. The government ﬁnances its expenditure ptgt through taxation, penalty on
11consumers when caught evading and the inﬂation tax (seigniorage). Formally the government
budget constraint can be written as follows:
ptgt = ¯¿tptwt + (1 ¡ q)µt(1 ¡ ¯)¿tptwt + (Mt ¡ Mt¡1) (20)
Note throughout the analysis we will assume that money growth is dictated by a rule, Mt =
(1 + ¹t)Mt¡1, where ¹ is the rate of growth of money. Using, Mt = °tDt, the government budget
constraint in real terms can be rewritten as




where dt = (Dt
pt ) is the size of deposits in real terms. Skinner and Slemrod (1985) points out that
the administrative costs of penalties is usually quite minor, and, hence, for simplicity we ignore
them from the government budget constraint.
3 Equilibrium
A valid perfect-foresight, competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of prices fpt;iDt;iLtg1
t=0,
allocations fct;nt;iktg1
t=0, stocks of ﬁnancial assets fmt;dtg1
t=0, and policy variables f°t;¹t;¿t;µt;gtg1
t=0
such that:
² Taking, ¿t, gt, µt, °t, ¹t, pt, the consumer optimally chooses ¯ such that (6) holds;
² Banks maximize proﬁts, taking, iLt, iDt, and °t as given and such that (9) holds;
² The real allocations solve the ﬁrm’s date–t proﬁt maximization problem, (12), given prices
and policy variables.
² The money market equilibrium conditions: mt = °tdt is satisﬁed for all t > 0.
12² The loanable funds market equilibrium condition: ptikt = (1 ¡ °t)Dt where the total supply
of loans Lt = (1 ¡ °t)Dt is satisﬁed for all t > 0.
² The goods market equilibrium condition require: ct + ikt + gt = k®
t n
(1¡®)
t is satisﬁed for all
t > 0.
² The labor market equilibrium condition: (nt)d =1 for all t > 0.
² The government budget is balanced on a period-by-period basis.
² dt, (1 + rdt) and pt must be positive at all dates and 1 + iLt > 1.
4 Optimal Degree of Tax Evasion
Using the equilibrium conditions, realizing that there is no growth in the model and allowing the
government to follow time invariant policy rules, which means the reserve–ratio, °t, the money
supply growth–rate, ¹t, the tax–rate, ¿t, and the penalty, µt, are constant over time, we have the
following set of equations:




w = (1 ¡ ®)k® (23)
(1 + rl) =
½®k(®¡1)
1 ¡ ½(1 + ¼)(1 ¡ ±k)
(24)
(1 ¡ °)[(1 ¡ ¯¿) ¡ µ¿(1 ¡ ¯)3 ¡ ´(1 ¡ ¯)2]w = ±kk (25)
where rl is the real interest rate on loans. Using (22) to (25) we can solve k in terms of the policy
variables, production parameters of the model and ¯ and is given by the following equation:
k =
µ





13Realizing that ¹= ¼, from the money market equilibrium condition, the gross real interest rate
on deposits (1 + rd), and real wage w are given by the following expressions:
(1 + rd) =
µ
½®±k
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ½(1 + ¹)(1 ¡ ±k))
¶µ
1






w = (1 ¡ ®)
½
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ °)


































A = 0 (29)
given that u0(ct+1) > 0. Once we derive the optimal value of ¯ by solving (29) in terms of the
parameters and policy variables we can obtain the reduced form solution to the other endogenous
variables in the model.
The derivative of (29) yields a non-linear equation for ¯ and needs to be solved in essentially an
non-algebraic fashion7 and hence the choice of parameter values become essential. The following
section discuses the process of calibration.
5 Calibration
In this section we attribute values to the parameters of our benchmark model using a combination
of ﬁgures from previous studies and facts about the economic experience for our sample economies
between 1980 and 1998.
7We can linearize the solution to (29) around the steady-state values of ¯, derived from Table 1, to obtain a reduced
form solution or plot the implicit function derived for values of ° between 0 to 0.99, given the other parameter values.
We take the latter approach, since we are not interested in explicitly solving for the other endogenous variables of the
model, but study mainly the behavior of the degree of tax evasion in response to change in the reserve-deposit ratio.
Besides, the loss of information associated with the linearization is unwarranted since it has bearing on our results.
14We follow the standard real business cycle literature in using steady–state conditions to establish
parameter values observed in the data. Some parameters are calibrated using country–speciﬁc
data, while others, without suﬃcient country–speciﬁc evidence over a long period, correspond
to prevailing values from the literature. This section reveals the general procedures used. The
calibrated parameters are reported in Tables 2. Note unless otherwise stated, the source for all
data is the IMF – International Financial Statistics (IFS).
A ﬁrst set of parameter values is given by numbers usually found in the literature. These are:
² (1¡®): since the production function is Cobb-Douglas, this corresponds to the share of labor
in income. (1¡®) for Spain, Italy, Greece, Belgium, France, Germany and U.K. is derived from
Zimmermann (1997) and the value for Portugal is obtained from Correia, Neves and Rebelo
(1995). Note for Belgium we use the world average of labor share reported in Zimmermann
(1997). The values lie between 53.0 percent (Portugal) and 63.5 percent (Germany);
² ±k: the depreciation rate of physical capital for Spain, Italy, Greece, Belgium, France, Ger-
many and U.K. is derived from Zimmermann (1997) and the value for Portugal is obtained
from Correia, Neves and Rebelo (1995). Note for Belgium we use the world average of capital-
output ratio reported in Zimmermann (1997) to arrive at the depreciation rate. The values
lie between 3.2 percent (Greece) and 7.6 percent (Germany);
² UGE: The parameter measures the size of the underground economy as a percentage of GDP.
The values are obtained from Schneider and Klinglmair (2004) and lies between 13.0 percent
(U.K) to 29.0 percent (Greece).
² µ: the penalty imposed by the government when the consumer is caught evading is obtained
from Chen (2003) and is set to 1.5 for all countries.
15² ´: the transaction cost parameter is obtained from Chen (2003) and is set to 0.15.
A second set of parameters is determined individually for each country. Here, we use averages
over the whole sample period to ﬁnd values that do not depend on the current business cycle. These
parameters are:
² ¼: the annual rate of inﬂation lies between 2.29 percent (Germany) and 15.16 percent
(Greece);
² °: the annual reserve–deposit ratio lies between 1 percent (Belgium) and 23.5 percent (Greece);
² ¿: the tax rate, calculated as the ratio of tax–receipts to GDP, lies between 22.74 percent
(Greece) and 42.10 percent (Belgium);
² iLt: the nominal interest rate on loans lies between 10.01 percent (France) and 22.96 percent
(Greece);
The following set of parameters are calibrated from the steady state equations of the model:
² ¹: the money growth rate is set equal to the rate of inﬂation, given the money market
equilibrium condition. The annual rate of money growth rate hence, lies between 2.29 percent
(Germany) and 15.16 percent (Greece);
² ½: the discount factor of the ﬁrms is solved to ensure that equation (24) holds. The value
ranges between 0.87 (Greece) to 0.99 (Germany).
² ¯: the fraction of reported income is determined by the method outlined in the calibration
section of chapter 3 and is not repeated here. We consider this exogenously evaluated value of
the reported income parameter as the steady-state value. Note the value hinges critically on
the size of the underground economy as a percentage of the GDP. The value of ¯ lies between
160.775 (Greece) and 0.885 (U.K), implying that 22.5 percent of the taxes are evaded in Greece
and the ﬁgure in U.K corresponds to a tx evasion of 11.5 percent.
² Á: the ratio of government expenditure to GDP is obtained using equations (2), (4) and (21).
The country speciﬁc value lies between 12.27 percent (Greece) and 21.49 percent (Belgium).
The resulting values for each of the economies are in fact pretty close to what is observed the
data. Except for Germany, the size of the government for all other economies are underesti-
mates. For country-speciﬁc sizes of government observed in the data, see Table 4 in Chapter
2.
Table 2: Calibration of Parameters
(1 ¡ ®) ±k UGE ¼ = ¹ ° ¿ iL ½ ¯ Á
Spain 0.627 0.05 23.1 7.52 14.1 25.53 12.89 0.94 0.810 13.62
Italy 0.617 0.052 27.3 8.58 13.7 36.25 15.02 0.93 0.786 18.38
Greece 0.598 0.032 29.0 15.16 23.5 22.74 22.96 0.87 0.775 12.27
Portugal 0.530 0.05 23.1 13.04 19.8 27.73 19.09 0.88 0.810 12.98
Belgium 0.618 0.046 22.5 3.59 1.0 42.10 10.71 0.97 0.816 21.49
France 0.599 0.033 14.9 4.54 2.0 37.30 10.01 0.96 0.870 19.55
Germany 0.635 0.076 14.9 2.29 6.0 31.80 10.85 0.99 0.870 17.70
UK 0.631 0.043 13.0 5.77 2.0 32.90 10.06 0.96 0.885 18.45
Note: Parameters deﬁned as above.
6 Tax Evasion, Reserve Requirements and Tax Penalty
As suggested earlier, given that the non-linearity of the model does not allow us to solve it in an
algebraic fashion, we plot the implicit function in the (°, ¯) plane, obtained from equation (29), to
17study the behavior of the endogenously determined tax evasion and reserve requirements. Figures
1 to 8 plots the relationship between the reported income and reserve requirements for each of the
eight countries, in the order of Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, France, Germany and U.K.
As can be seen, the reported income, and hence the degree of tax evasion, is independent of the
reserve requirements, for all eight countries. Below, Table 3 reports the approximate optimal value
of the reported income, ¯, predicted by the model. Setting the value of ® at 1
2 for Spain, allows
us to solve the model algebraically. The solution yields ﬁve roots for ¯, but the only legitimate
solution is found to be a value, 0.64, clearly independent of the reserve-requirements.8
Next we study the behavior of the steady-state reported income in the (°, ¯) plane following
a doubling of the transaction cost parameter, namely ´. The comparative static exercise shows an
upward shift of the reported income line, for all the eight countries. This suggests that an economy
with a less corrupt structure will have a higher steady-state reported income.9 To save space we
present here the ﬁgures corresponding to Spain only. When compared to Figure 1, Figure 9 clearly
vindicates the point made above. The approximate optimal value of the reported income increases
by nearly 9 percent, moving from 0.64 to 0.73. Below, Table 3 reports the approximate optimal
value of the reported income, ¯, predicted by the model, for all economies when ´ is doubled.
Finally, we also study the relationship between the steady-state reported income with the penalty
rate when caught evading taxes, µ and then with the income tax-rate, ¿. Each of the eight countries
were found to bear a positive relationship between steady-state reported income and penalty rates,
while the relationship between steady-state reported income and tax rate is found to be negative.
8For Spain, the calibrated value of ½, corresponding to ® =
1
2, was found to be 0.92. Repeating the experiment
for all other economies yielded a constant for the optimal value of reported income ¯.
9Note ½ is the only parameter that needs to be re-calibrated when we change the value of ´. However, since the
value of ½ was found to be extremely robust for all countries, with changes observed only in the fourth decimal place,
it has not been reported in Table 2.
18The model thus suggests that increases in the penalty rates of evading taxes would induce consumers
to report greater fraction of their income, while increases in the income-tax rates would cause them
to evade greater fraction of their income. As before, to save space we present here the ﬁgures
corresponding to Spain only. Figures 10 and 11 indicates the nature of the relationship of steady-
state reported income with µ and ¿, respectively. Though the relationships between tax-evasion
with tax-rate and penalty rate seems standard, however, what is more important, is that we in fact
can provide estimates to the strength of such relationships. Table 4 reports the derivative of the
reported income with respect to tax rate and the penalty rate, obtained using the implicit function
theorem evaluated at the steady-state value of the reported income obtained from the model and
the average tax rates derived from the data. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study
that tries to quantify such eﬀects, in a general equilibrium framework. Tax rates are found to have
much stronger eﬀects on the reported income than the penalty rates.
The results of the model thus, clearly explains the fact outlined in Table 1, about countries
with similar degree of tax evasion having diﬀerent reserve requirements — the reason being the
fact, as suggested by the model, the reported income is found to be independent of the reserve
requirements. The model suggests, that given the production parameter, the discount rate, and
policy variables, economies can have similar levels of tax evasion but diﬀerent levels of reserve
requirements as a result of the transaction cost parameter of the model. However, to validate such
a claim we require more accurate information on country-speciﬁc values of this parameter. Besides
this, a couple of other observations are noteworthy: (i) When compared to Table 2, as can be seen
from Table 3, the model tends to be biased downwards as far as predicting the equilibrium values
of reported income are concerned, and; (ii) The model does not match the ranking of countries
according to their reported income.
19Table 3: Model Prediction of ¯
¯¤









Note: Derived from equation (29).













Note: Derived from equation (29).
207 Optimal Policy Decisions
Given the optimal value of the reported income, the model is well-equipped in determining the
optimal values of the policy parameters in such an environment. The social planner maximizes the
rate of return on deposits choosing ¿, °, ¹ = ¼ and µ, to determine the optimal choices of the
policy variables, subject to the set of inequality constraints: 0 · ¿ · 1, 0 · ° · 1, ¹ ¸ 0 and, µ
> 1, (1 ¡ q)µ < 1 and the government budget constraint evaluated at the steady state. Note the
constraint (1 ¡ q)µ < 1 or alternatively, (1 ¡ ¯)2µ < 1, ensures that the expected penalty rate is
less than one.
Table 4: Optimal Decision Variables (´=0.15 and 0.30)
Countries ¿¤ ¹¤ °¤ µ¤
´ = 0.15 ´ = 0.30 ´ = 0.15 ´ = 0.30 ´ = 0.15 ´ = 0.30 ´ = 0.15 ´ = 0.30
Spain 31.43 28.18 11.98 11.98 0.40 0.10 1.01 3.19
Italy 0.001 0.04 87.17 89.57 65.15 64.75 4.93 9.40
Greece 24.28 22.07 18.74 18.74 0.50 0.02 4.04 22.68
Portugal 0 0 71.82 72.07 59.82 59.88 7.30 13.72
Belgium 1.00 0.75 112.60 110.44 65.59 67.45 6.08 8.52
France 0.001 38.86 48.76 7.72 99.98 0.4 1.00 4.89
Germany 0.01 0.02 79.83 80.75 63.69 63.55 5.26 7.74
UK 45.78 40.34 8.80 0 1.0 0 1.00 1.00
Notes: All values are in percentages.
The optimal values of the policy variables, corresponding to ´ =0.15 and 0.30 are reported in
Table 4. Though we do not observe any speciﬁc pattern to the movements in ¿ and ¹, the penalty
rate, is equal to or higher corresponding to ´ =0.30, since the reported income is higher in this
case than when ´ = 0.15 and hence reduces the probability of being caught. The optimal value
21of the reserve requirement decreases for all economies except for Portugal and Belgium, when the
optimal value of the reported income increases for ´ = 0.30, indicating a lower level of corruption,
compared to ´ = 0.15. Moreover, the model does not vindicate the popular belief in the literature
that, countries with higher tax evasion tend to have higher reserve requirements. Notice, contrary
to the general results that emerge out of overlapping generations model deriving optimal values of
policy parameters, the model promises high values of the optimal money growth rate but is ﬁnite.10
Note the optimal values not only vary within countries for alternative values of the corruption
parameter, but also across countries.
8 Conclusion and Areas of Further Research
This paper analyzes the relationship between the “optimal” degree of tax evasion and mandatory
cash reserve requirements required to be held by banks, for eight European economies, using a
simple overlapping generations framework. More precisely, the analysis tries to provide a microe-
conomic foundation to the process of tax evasion given the policy decisions of the social planner.
The motivation for such an analysis is simply derived from the observed fact in the data that,
there are several countries with same, or nearly same, degree of tax evasion but widely diﬀerent
levels of reserve requirements. Strictly speaking, the paper tries to provide an explanation to this
observation. As an aside we also derive the optimal values of the policy variables given the degree
of tax evasion.
We proceeded based on the initial premises that the above observation may be a fallout of any
two of the following possibilities
(i) There may be multiple levels of tax evasion given the reserve requirements and other policy
10For a detailed discussion, see Freeman (1987) and Bhattacharya and Haslag (2001).
22variables;
(ii) The optimal degree of tax evasion may be completely unaﬀected by the movements in reserve
requirements. As our results indicate it is the latter. The steady-state reported income, and hence
the degree of tax evasion, is found to be independent of the reserve requirements, for all of the
eight countries. The model also suggests, the following somewhat obvious facts we tend to believe
about tax evasion: (i) An economy with a lesser corrupted structure will have a higher steady-
state of value of reported income; (ii) Increases in the penalty rates of evading taxes would induce
consumers to report greater fraction of their income, while increases in the income-tax rates would
cause them to evade greater fraction of their income, and ; (iii) The model does not vindicate the
popular belief in the literature that, countries with lower percentage of reported income tend to
have higher reserve requirements.
In summary, the model suggests, that given the production parameter, the discount rate, and
policy variables, economies can have similar levels of tax evasion but diﬀerent levels of reserve
requirements as a result of the transaction cost and probability parameters of the model. To
validate such a claim we, however, require more accurate information on country-speciﬁc values of
this parameter. Hence future research needs to be oriented along these lines. Selected References
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24Figure 1: Reported Income and Reserve Requirements for Spain, ´ = 0.15








Figure 2: Reported Income and Reserve Requirements for Italy, ´ = 0.15








25Figure 3: Reported Income and Reserve requirements for Greece, ´ = 0.15








Figure 4: Reported Income and Reserve requirements for Portugal, ´ = 0.15








26Figure 5: Reported Income and Reserve requirements for Belgium , ´ = 0.15








Figure 6: Reported Income and Reserve Requirements for France, ´ = 0.15








27Figure 7: Reported Income and Reserve Requirements for Germany, ´ = 0.15








Figure 8: Reported Income and Reserve Requirements for U.K, ´ = 0.15








28Figure 9: Reported Income and Reserve Requirements for Spain, ´ = 0.30








Figure 10: Reported Income and Tax Evasion Penalty for Spain ´ = 0.15








29Figure 11: Reported Income and Tax Rate for Spain, ´ = 0.15
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